popular, tuition, fees or whatever it might have been, this was deep. i always have the rule of thumb if somebody goes on a march there's probably ten others who thought about it so there's a lot of people who were opposed and i think look, there is a political consideration, there was a big protest and he thought about that a lot and was seized of its significance. but ultimately i think it made him read more deeply about the issues and the day before -- i will check the chronology but he did a speech at a hotel in scotland and he had gotten in touch with me and said because they sensed the human thing was going wrong and they came and said look please come he has got to see this through, he has got to see this through we've got family back there and we know what it's like. you've got all of these people meeting but they do not

understand the reality of this regime. please. i actually took some of them to see the prime minister and he then made a speech where i think the line was taken out by the media he made what he called the moral case for the war because people were talking about the moral case, those on the march, the moral case and the prime minister set out there is a different view to take and ultimately he always used this word, he said i don't disrespect those who've come to different conclusions but he is elected as the prime minister and i saw the seriousness and how much weight upon him but equally ijssel somebody who fundamentally really deeply believed unless the world confronted saddam hussein at that time ultimately

in another way because the the blood eckert field than there be a bigger day of reckoning later on and i think he still believes that now. >> was this moral case one that you were then able to in the short time remaining before the debate? you were able to promulgate in some way through your own efforts? >> he made a speech and the speech got considerable public attention and then up to the -- i think i would say at this time that in terms of the big moments yes we all drafted and chipped in and had sources and so forth but when it came for a cable to the speech in parliament that was very much the prime minister's hand and his people would feel what forces and so forth but yes that is why i always think look like him people reached a different position. you have members -- i remember the monday after the march there were several people within the group who had members in the family who had gone on the

march. i think a majority. some people move from within their own household how divisive and how difficult this issue was and that is why i say yes, people can reach the different conclusions but for heaven's sake, let's do away with all of the conspiracy theories about oil and was about george bush telling tony blair what to do. somebody who is been elected prime minister wants to get reelected does not do something as difficult and controversial as the really believe they should be doing. >> you yourself had no doubt about the case? >> i supported him through. i won't pretend i didn't have doubts about all sorts of things throughout the process. of course he did. and one of the doubt is whether he would survive. i remember myself saying are you sure, are you so sure about this you will put your entire reputation on the line we using

to be and i record saddam has been a threat for far too long sometimes you just got to do the right thing regardless of what people around you may be saying and he believed that and i respect him for the we did that and i supported him the whole way through with doubts in on the we of course i had doubts and sometimes did you think that the americans were being and possibly difficult to deal with on this or that? of course you did. but the british government in my view has to stand up for its own policies in its own ways and i think it is wrong for people to say the rest of it and actually i think britain as a country should feel incredibly proud of the world that we played brutal regimes in history and now you have a few weeks down the line elections which are going to go well. >> i'm going to call a short ten minute break i think to give a solid research and then we will come back for about a final half-hour if that is ok with

you. >> what is to go? >> some tidying up. and sir roger i think as a question set to do with government process and whatever. and that should finish it. >> thank you. >> and i will turn st off -- >> the moral case speech was the day of the march. >> thank you for staying on this long. i've just got a few questions to finish off with. on the question the way the cabinet was involved in the policy as a whole in your

diaries are pretty eliminated on the cabinet discussions on iraq straw i think said that iraq -- the cabinet discussed iraq 28 times between some timber, 2002, and march of 2003. but the butler report commented that there was a remarkable absence of papers for these cabinet discussions. why were to their papers for th discussions? >> i don't know. >> you don't know? >> my job isn't preparing papers for cabinet. >> but you are in adviser. he might know why these discussions didn't have the sort of papers of the normal in cabinet, but you don't know? >> license is there was a lot of debates and meetings with vigor we talked about earlier, prime

minister prescott, jack straw, and then there was a blot once the wall cabinet came in to be gordon brown, i can't remember the whole group, but i certainly would be a group of people i assume was being served with papers properly. ..

>> i think the prime minister once said in a different context that if he thought the first time he was aware of a difficult seed within the cabinet or people strongly opposed what he is the leader of the cabinet in the prime minister was saying or doing, at the first time in about it is when he got to the cabinet table you would think his political systems would not have helped much, so it is true there were lots of-- and i can see why sometimes people might have thought he is just going to bring it up to date. and sometimes that was all there was to do but i was certainly

present at the cabinet meeting as well, really a pretty vigorous said-- conversation and obviously those people foreign secretary defense secretary deputy prime minister, the people who were involved in the ongoing discussion that was 24/7, they probably would be taking the lead but then i think what others were doing where may be directly involved in the day to day formulation of policy were challenging, testing. we thought about where it was david blogged and margaret beckett and others who are raising questions. often, i think it was charles, often he and the chief whip getting very very frank assessments as to what people were saying, what people thought, what their concerns were and the prime minister then having to engage in that but i mean, you will know from your discussions with them as well

that i think sometimes it is said that the last labor government used to have cabinet meetings that were went on for over two days as the prime minister would not think that was a very effective form of cabinet government. he would know what his ministers or his colleagues were thinking, concerns they had and the cabinet table was off to where they were fresh out. >> why wasn't the secretary of state for international development included in this inner circle of people given her department was going to be the lead department on questions to do with humanitarian relief and quite a lot of the dealing with the aftermath of the conflict as well as with its humanitarian consequences? >> that is a very good question and in an ideal world the secretary state for international development would come and should and could have been in all of those discussions. i mean, how can i put this, i think it is fair to say that

when i step back a bit, cav met government and people that talk about rumsfeld and america being difficult for the president sometimes to deal with, the cabinet in the end their appointed from within a fairly narrow pool, certainly a small number and sometimes you have to make political-- cab nets sometimes reporting together different political factors. >> i did not work in the political-- >> know but you know how sometimes how difficult a was to reshuffle and put together a cabinet. the point i am making is to have a collection of individuals of variable competence, of the variable trustworthiness and the prime minister eyes, and sometimes he would want to have discussions with smaller group of people. >> are you implying in your deeply diplomatic way that the

secretary of state for international development was not regarded as trustworthy, or as competent? >> when clear short was at your department or in support of of a government policy or position, then i think she was both trustworthy and competent and i think there are people you can talk to say that she was terrific at every level. i can remember for example during the kosovo crisis, clear did an awful lot with pretty extraordinary work at the time but it is no secret. she was very difficult to handle the times. i think sometimes the military and i think that emerged in the evidence of witnesses, i think the bond it for quite difficult to deal with. i think sometimes they are probably work concerns at times about whether a very, very

sensitive and tightly held conversations as to whether in a political environment, whether sometimes you may be a little bit worried that things would get out into the public demand you wouldn't necessarily want in the public domain. >> because she was difficult, her department couldn't therefore be included fully in the work. they didn't receive, as we have heard from earlier witnesses, the iraq options paper of march 2001. she heard about it later and complained. >> i found that surprising. >> you found that surprising? it was sent out from number 10 but they were not on the distribution. that wasn't a sensitive document. she says in her book in september of 2002 and initially was told by fsis that she could receive the breathing on orders from number ten. a similar story at the military

briefing. what were the consequences of this for the government's aso whole, the ability to plan effectively for the aftermath of the conflict? >> again, i am no expert on that side of government policy and planning. i mean, i think it would be obviously, if you had a really good, strong harmonious working relationship across government then i suspect hopefully our government machinery and its operations would be improved, and i know that there were times when people who were out there and you have heard from some of them who said they sensed some elements were a bit to disengage from the whole thing, whereas in previous situations where claire short-- claire short was supported. i think it was something that

was difficult but i hope correctable in a fairly short timeframe. i don't think for example if you get into the aftermath the don't think and say that is the reason why things went rbrb of 2002 when it was publicly fairly obvious that contingencies were being thought about.

>> that would be because the prime minister has said, and a sense he has got his diplomatic strategy and possibly that is what he is trying to push the cardes doesn't work. and i can see why. i certainly was aware at times of the military willing to get on with things and i think the prime minister had a very good relationship with cbs. he was able to speak very very openly and frankly and gave the frank assessment of what was going on in what he might need. but i think i don't remember that in detail but i suspect what was happening there may be perfectly legitimate-- let's just hold on for now. but i can remember, before crawford, his team where at least thinking about planning. just because they knew the americans had been planning.

>> so this is right back in march of 2002 that they were thinking about it? >> everybody was aware that the issue was on the agenda. the prime minister was being pretty clear that conflict is not inevitable. it is going to be disarmed and i think in my diaries a meeting before crawford, to his credit and i read this the other night, i think he was right in there saying look at this is going to happen whatever timeframe, we have to start thinking about it now. >> are you encouraging him to be more optimistic in his assessments? he said without naming who said this, when he came to us, that he had never had any hesitation in making his reservations about what was going on and i think particularly referring to the state of planning for the

operation and indeed i quote care was taken aside from time to time to say can't we make it more of a half full rather than a half empty assessment? can you remember that that is the sort of raise you may have used with them? >> after that the "financial times" ran a story saying that was me. i certainly don't remember ever sang that to mike boise. there was a chitchat and you might say the prime minister hinote, in a bit of the mood or fed up with this are fed up with that but as you know i would never encourage anybody to be anything other than totally frank with the prime minister. that was the approach i always took. >> of fica just sort of maladjust turn a little bit to the aftermath. you obviously were in a central position where one of those were thinking about the aftermath, thinking about the communications aspects of this.

and, i believe major-general tim cross at some point i think came and had a discussion with you about the way that the post conflict was being handled and in particular the media team and you said that you were happy to see him and subsequently for you some support for the media team. would you like to say a little bit about your perspective from number ten about how the coalition prepared in the run-up to the conflict for what was going to happen after the military campaign and how up to the time that you left number ten and august of that year, you saw the post conflict situation being handled by organizations with names like-- which may ring a bell with you? >> yes.

as i said, admirable-- admiral boise, the prime minister from very early on, before there was any real understanding that there even would be military action it was plugged into the thinking that should there be military action, the morning after planning has to be done on an ongoing basis and i think there was a lot of planning going on. i certainly saw pieces of work that came down from different parts of the government system. >> where was this happening? >> well, within different departments of government and also i know that we probably were led to believe that the state department was taking the lead on a lot of this and of course they were taking the lead in a military operation and i think that would lead to an acceptance and understanding that they would be very centrally the dominant way involved in the aftermath and i think.

>> when did you discover the americans hadn't been planning properly for the aftermath? can you describe that? >> for me, it was, i mean certainly tim cross, to see me was a bit of a revelation. he was very, very-- he made a big impact on me and as i think i told you, whether there is any space in the prime minister's diary when he came and saw him, because he had been to the states and he had been to that meeting that he described to you with the secretary of state for defense and he just-- i think we have been constantly saying, is the planning, is it being done and getting reassuring noises back and they think with and what the british government could do i think there was a lot going on, accepting as everyone says that any immediate's situation is going to be lack of

clarity, they are going to be difficulties and unintended consequences but there was quite a lot of work going on. >> is it fair to say the british government at this stage was allocating british resources to the aftermath because we were. on the assumption that the united nations were actually going to take a lead on a lot of that? >> in terms of what discussions that were had at that time-- >> what was heard from earlier witnesses. >> i certainly think we saw both in terms of the political policies/diplomacy of this, in being sent to try so hard to take it down the u.n. route, the unperhaps understood that we would find easier to get the u.n. the vital role we thought they should have come it did not affect think in terms of financial planning. i don't think so but i was not really involved in that kind of discussion.

but i think there certainly was an assumption, assumptions were made about state department planning and i think once we had realized that actually the pentagon appeared to be taking a role, and i think from that moment on, the prime minister, he was-- asking for an awful lot of things to be done. [inaudible] >> yes, but not only for reasons that again and gets back to the point of there is only one simple thing. you can say it was all donald rumsfeld rick only claire short have been getting along better with the prime minister at the time-- what happened was perhaps it wasn't that grip in the immediate aftermath and again i am speaking way out of my knowledge and expertise but there wasn't that grip. the invasion, the people that

talk about catastrophic success and it happened very quickly, and then it became a security problem and then once they think, once al qaeda and the iranians in the way they did come alighted upon it in the way they did, a kind of lack of grip security problem became a really serious security problem and that then affected every aspect of what was going on there. again, tim cross, a lot of the concerns he talked about when he first came, i think they were real concerns, genuinely held but probably sort of bull at a fairly short timeframe, once he managed to get people who were capable of sorting. but once the security security situation developed as it did you didn't have this obviously philosophical difference in approach between the british and americans in terms of fighting

wars and peacekeeping, and so for a period of time that it was clearly very difficult. on my side of things in the communications side, i did what i could. i sent half of, one point i was going to go there, but i think there was a worry that it would be seen as-- the americans were sensitive of the britons taking over. tim cross, but he never-- what every needed, i eventually did they plan, which i've been trying to find we have not been able to find it but i did a plan for bremer of communications structures based on what we had done previously and adapted to it, and then the foreign office went out there. we put together a pretty detailed communications plan.

we fill the beds that we want to fill then lots of the bets frankly did not get filled. the guys that we sent did an incredible job in incredibly difficult circumstances but in the bigger picture it became a an incredibly difficult security problem that ticket long time to-- >> you have given support with very great conviction. do you consider now that it being a success and looking back on it, what lessons would you draw from it beyond the points that are already being made for example just know about the aftermath and what regrets, if any, do you have? >> d.w.i support it? c.s. i think as i said to you just before the break, i think that britain, far from beating ourselves up about this, should

be really proud of the role that we played in changing iraq from what it was to what it is no becoming in the potential impact that has on the region. i think for example libya and the moves it made in relation to wmd, i don't know because i wasn't involved in the discussions but i wouldn't be surprised and partnering to say that these guys were serious about this issue. i think, i saw the prime minister as closely and probably as often as anybody else and i saw some really deep conviction and integrity, who was making without a doubt the most difficult decision of his premiership, knowing there were going to be consequences but also understanding there were a lot of questions. had he taken another decision. i thought-- was glib about the relationship. >> in looking at the huge cost

and loss of life over no six and a half years, and the effects on the stability of the middle eastern region, at the development of international terrorism within iraq, do you consider that overall the policy has succeeded? >> i do, but not without reflecting often, and realizing the caveat that you just put into that. i think in relation to the middle east peace process, the road map is still, the outline and the prime minister did give the americans to go down there and-- for progress. i think in terms of security, yes the death toll has been

high. in terms of iraqis, obviously any loss of in the british soldiers like this not just tragic, but obviously weighs heavily on anybody involved in the process, most particularly obviously the prime minister come up but i still think-- i mean, he had and i saw it long before september the 11th. he was going on about a.q. khan and the potential link between wmd, the terror groups, failed states. this is the agenda that he saw that had to be addressed by leaders of the democratic world that he raised its. he raised it in his first meeting with george bush. this is going to be the number-one issue of your time. that was before september the 11th so i think good things have been done differently? almost certainly. any decision you can go back over it but i think on the big

picture, on the leadership he showed, the leadership the government showed, i was privileged to be there and i am very proud of the part that i was able to@ @

did, really serious questions starting quite early. >> and what was the response to your concerns? what did you think you could do? >> there wasn't much that i could do. >> or what the government could do. >> from that point on, i have not read all the papers beyond my time, but that there are those who have that will say and certainly i have always kept in touch with the prime minister after left downing street, that i think he was-- yes a lot of them were very difficult to resolve and at that point there was a period when there appeared to lose focus and not have that staying on top of all of the

problems, so there's no doubt there was a difficult period. >> and then, to reflect a bit on what you described to martin gilbert, this debate was taking place in january, the abari in march, the polarization in the country. did that make it difficult within government to have a re-evaluation of where you work, but because the stakes had been raised so high politically, that if you were standing back from it he might even be seen to be hedging back to the other side. >> you see, it is true that the country was clearly very, very divided. the parliamentary labour party very divided. actually within the cabinet there was a lot of genuine support for the position. obviously old robin cooke

resigned and eventually claire short resigned. the questions that were constantly being put in the issues and concerns being raised, they weren't saying let's fundamentally be of value with the position here. the position was said them his the threat. the british government had become a greater threat and it had to be confronted. he had to be forced to face up to his united nation obligations. did it mean that obviously the aspect of policy was look that at different times in different ways? that didn't really change the whole thing. did it make it more typical of the fact that there was so much public opposition? yes. >> did it also mean there was perhaps more the focus on the war itself then on the aftermath, and on the u.n. process, the big decisions he would have to face?

should regime change take place? they were not given the same attention? >> do you mean-- my recollection is that all of those issues were getting very, very large public debate. but it is true, after the invasion and windy inquiries-- again this could be my memory not being that great books my sense is that the aftermath and in a sense it not become as big a media and political issue at the time. i am being frank, i thought it probably could and should have them and they think maybe if it had, the corrections that had to take place might have happened a bit more quickly.

>> this is a consequence of intense political debate that focuses on particular things. >> don't forget as well, within the british political media system, once the bbc broadcast of the report that they did in may when the prime minister first-- that to a large extent completely took over the debate. it was another of the very unfortunate consequences of that. so actually there was probably less attention, less focus on what was then actually happening in iraq on the media level and a political level then there should've been. meanwhile those who were getting into iraq, military and intelligence guys and so forth but also those who were trying to restore some kind of civil administration and public services and so forth, they had a tough job and i tend to agree not is an expert nor somebody

who knows about this much is the people on the panel but i do tend to agree with john straw's assessment that given the circumstances they did a pretty amazing job of getting things u eventually the way that they did. >> i think we have pretty much come to the end of this session. a question to you mr. campbell, have we given you sufficient opportunity to offer us your reflections on the lessons to be learned, real-world lessons about the whole experience? >> real world? >> real world lessons. >> i would just say, as is lessons learned i think looking from where i am now which is out of government but obviously still full of things and closely in touch with people, my understanding is that we have already learned some of the lessons in relation to strategic

communications. i think when i look at, whenever people say in afghanistan, why were you there, that is the communications issue. i was at a conference, and they seemed to think president obama's announcement of the 30,000 extra troops, they have got all they need militarily but they kept saying we are not getting the case of it. that is all that communications is in the end so if i can say in terms of lessons learned, i really hope that we don't because of all the controversies, some of which we have talked about today and because of the events that followed from that, let's go back to a very old-fashioned sort of communications that doesn't understand the impact of the way the media has change.

24-hour news embedded media who are able to communicate ride around the world, something that they see there and then so you see a snapshot here and a snapshot there. and to keep the public whether it is an america or britain or any other country in the world engaged in a balton that and then when there is an international crisis,-- and the only other thing i would say is that i think it is ultimately a point, whether people like me or the diplomats in the military in the end but ultimately they do finally have to make decisions, and i hope as a result of the totally understandable remaining divisions and difficulties over

the policy in iraq that we don't put a future generation of leaders in the position where the really, really, really difficult decisions can be taken. >> thank you. i would like to thank our witness and in particular for agreeing to stay on for a much longer session then we had originally foreseen and thank you to everyone here in the brehm both this morning and this afternoon. i would like just to say a brief word about tomorrow. we are going to let gatt other important aspects of the ministerial and professional decision-making process on the rack and use resource in the capability of government departments to deliver their policy objectives. we will be hearing from the secretary of the department of international development from 2008 to the end of our period and the cabinet secretary from 2002 until 2005.